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Abstract
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses
to one another).  In ``weak-link" coordination games players choose a number 1-7. Their payoff is
increasing in the minimum number (or weakest link) and decreasing in the difference between
their number and the minimum.  Choosing 7 is an ``efficient" equilibrium because it gives
everybody a higher payoff than any other coordinated choice. Higher-payoff equilibria are riskier,
however, so the game expresses the tradeoff between group efficiency and personal risk present
in many social and organizational settings.  We tested whether choosing efficiently in a weak-link
game increases cooperative play in a subsequent prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. This cross-game
transfer resembles transfer of cooperative norms in small firms (which are more like coordination
games than PDs) as firms grow larger and become like PDs. In two experiments, if a group of
players share a history of playing the weak-link game efficiently, that efficiency precedent can
transfer to a subsequent PD game, improving the level of cooperativeness.  The effect of transfer
is much larger in magnitude (increasing cooperation from 15-30% to 71%) than the effects of
most variables in previous PD studies.  However, the transfer effect depends on descriptive
similarity of strategies in the two games, since it largely disappears when the strategies are
numbered differently in the weak-link game and the PD.
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Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a
Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games
Blau (1964) describes the development of cooperation within exchange relationships as a
slow process, starting with minor transactions in which little trust is required because little risk is
involved, and eventually expanding into much riskier situations that require significantly higher
levels of trust to generate cooperative behavior.  If this sort of trust-building works, it does so
because a counterpart’s behavior in the less risky situation serves as a precedent for his or her
behavior in the riskier situation.  Since organizations are complex webs of exchange relationships
(Baker, 1994), these precedent effects are important in organizational environments.
In this paper, we use game theory to formalize how cooperative relationships develop
through precedents.  Then we run experiments to see whether a precedent of efficient play in a
coordination game will raise the level of cooperative behavior in a finite horizon prisoner's
dilemma (PD) game.  We first illustrate our idea with a simple example, and later present the
more complex games used in the experiments.
Consider the PD game and the coordination game displayed in Tables 1a and 1b.  (The
upper left payoff in each cell is the row player's payoff; the lower right payoff is the column
player's payoff.)  The “efficient” outcome is the one which is unambiguously better for both
players. In both games efficient outcome occurs when both players select C (cooperate).
However, in the PD game it is a dominant strategy to play D (defect); individually rational
players who are trying to maximize their own payoffs will both choose D, leaving both players
worse off.
In the coordination game, in contrast, choosing C is a best response to an expectation of
C; so if one player expects the other to cooperate (with sufficiently high probability) then she will
cooperate, and both player are better off.  In the language of game theory, the efficient (C,C)
2outcome is a Nash equilibrium in the coordination game, but the inefficient outcome (D,D) is the
only Nash equilibrium in the PD game.  Note that the only difference between these two games is
the payoff a player receives if she defects when the other players cooperate (known as the
temptation payoff).  In the PD, the temptation payoff (of eight) is higher than the payoff of five to
reciprocating cooperation, while in the coordination game the temptation payoff (two) is lower
than the reciprocation payoff.
Our prediction is that the shared experience (or precedent) of playing the efficient
outcome in a coordination game will increase the likelihood of cooperative (efficient) play in a
finitely repeated PD game.
Why Study Transfer of Precedent?
Before describing where the precedent hypothesis comes from, it is useful to ask why it is
important to study the effectiveness of precedent across social situations.  There are at least three
reasons.  First, many firms use training practices which depend on precedent for their
effectiveness.  In recent years businesses have become particularly interested in how to get people
within their organizations to trust one another more and coalesce as teams.  Organizations use
trust-building exercises, such as asking one person to fall backwards with her eyes closed while
others prepare to catch her before she hits the ground, to build trust.  The implicit hypothesis is
that the falling person will learn to trust fellow employees in general, so she will trust them more
in business situations (trusting underlings to finish an urgent report on time or prepare adequately
for a big client presentation).  A similar example is taking groups of employees on “Outward
Bound”-type outdoor adventures that require teamwork (such as rock climbing, or white-water
rafting).  The hypothesis, again, is that learning to work like a team in the wild will establish a
precedent which transfers to working like a team in the concrete jungle back home.  We know of
no scientific evidence on whether these exercises work.  Experiments like ours provide one very
simple way to evaluate whether transfer of efficiency precedents works, which may provide some
clues about whether these business exercises work.
3A second reason to study transfer of precedent as we do is that the transition from
coordination games to PD games mimic’s the path of organizational challenges as firms grow
from small to large, in an extremely simplified way.  Suppose that a basic interaction in
organizations involves how much individuals contribute to the organization's goals, and that
players prefer to contribute little money or time (they play a PD; Mannix, 1991).  The key idea is
if players are empathetic toward one another, or if players are sufficiently able to monitor, and
punish or sanction, employees who defect, then PD games actually have the same utility payoffs
as coordination games.  Under those conditions, self-interested players prefer to reciprocate
cooperation rather than defect, corresponding to Table 1b payoffs rather than Table 1a payoffs
(Camerer & Knez, 1996a, for details).  Conditions of high empathy and easy monitoring and
punishment are more likely to hold in small firms, since employees will known one another
personally, and everyone knows who is pitching in and who isn't.  As firms grow larger, new
employees are less likely to empathize with one another, and the ability to catch and punish
defectors probably falls, so that the games become PD's.  Therefore, the same organizational
activities which begin as coordination games at a small scale---one employee will do her part if
she expects others to do theirs (because she cares about the others, or is afraid of getting caught)--
-disintegrate into PD's as firms grow larger.  If small firms are able to achieve a precedent of
efficiency by coordinating, and the precedent transfers to subsequent games, they may be able to
sustain efficient behavior even when the basic game their employees pay changes from
coordination to a PD.  Our experiments mimic precisely this process of switching from
coordination to PD over time, and tests whether a precedent of efficiency transfers.  To the extent
that the experiments are externally valid-- which is, of course, always a matter of debate-- the
results will suggest whether firms that start out small, and are able to establish a culture or norm
of cooperation, will be able to sustain that norm when it is no longer sustained by empathy or
fear.
4Obviously, the analogies between our very simple experiments and naturally-occurring
organizations are imperfect.  The idea is to use the experimental findings to inspire a search for
similar patterns in field data.  The simple experiments are also a flexible baseline which can be
enriched (like a blank canvas that can be painted): If the experiments appear to lack
generalizability because they do not have a particular feature of  naturally-occurring
organizations, if that feature can be clearly articulated then it can be added to the experimental
design in future work.
A third contribution of our paper is to study a new way in which the PD might be
“solved.”  Many studies have found that changing the way the game is described, allowing
players to communicate, and so forth, have modest, albeit interesting, effects in the rate of
cooperation and defection (Ledyard, 1995; & Sally, 1995).  Our study finds a huge change in the
rate of cooperation due to transfer of precedent: In two-player PD's, 15% of players chose the
most cooperative action when playing PD's for the first time (and 30% did so in the first period of
a second round of PD's), while 71% of players who played a coordination game efficiently
subsequently chose the most cooperative action in PD.  Putting aside questions of interpretation,
this effect is simply much larger than the effects of most variables, which have been exhaustively
studied (Sally's, 1995, review).
Weak-link Coordination and PD Games
We use the “weak-link” coordination game shown in Table 2 to study precedent. In the
weak-link game, each subject picks an action from the set of integers {1,2, …, 7}.  The table
shows the payoffs from selecting a particular action (a row), given the minimum action chosen by
the other subjects (a column).  For example, player A picks a five while B picks a three.  The
minimum action is three.  A earns $.70 and B earns $.90.  Player B "loses" $.20 by picking an
action two units above the minimum action selected.  Notice that each player wants to select
exactly the minimum of the other players, but everyone wants the minimum to be as high as
possible.  As a result, high actions are risky because other players may select lower actions.
5This game is called a weak-link game because, like a chain whose strength depends on its
weakest link, the common component of each player's payoff depends on the lowest action
anyone takes.  Camerer and Knez (1996a,b) suggest that weak-link games are useful models of
social and project-based organizational processes which are very sensitive to the level of the
worst input (Bryant, 1983; Becker & Murphy, 1992).  A social example is meeting a large group
of people at a crowded restaurant which will not seat anybody until the last person arrives.  An
economic example is price competition among identical firms, who must match the cheapest price
(and lose more customers when their original price is higher).  Organizational examples include
chemical recipes, and safety in “high-reliability organizations” (such as nuclear power plants),
which have accidents if a single mistake occurs.
Many examples involve synchronicity in time.  Suppose (i) a team's product is not
finished until the slowest player finishes; (ii) everyone prefers the product to be finished earlier;
and (iii) no player wants to finish their portion before the slowest player does.  Then the players
are playing a weak-link game.  These conditions hold in any organization or work unit for which
the completion of a project requires that a set of highly interdependent activities are performed in
a timely fashion.  Examples include investment banking activities (doing deals), software
development, building satellites and---familiar to academics---contributing chapters to an edited
book.  In these examples, free-riding is not the source of inefficient outcomes; it’s not possible to
free-ride, per se, because if free riders do not perform their tasks they do not benefit.  Instead, the
source of inefficiency is a combination of a lack of mutual understanding about the game and
mutual expectations of how others will behave in a highly interdependent work environment.
The weak-link game allows us to study mutual expectations while controlling for mutual
understanding.
The weak-link game has two key game-theoretic properties.  First, each of the outcomes
on the diagonal satisfies the mutual best response property of Nash equilibrium (but the off-
diagonal outcomes do not).  Therefore, any number X has the property that, in theory, if players
6expect it to be the minimum, they will choose it and it will be the minimum.  Second, every
equilibrium is “Pareto-dominated” by all higher-numbered equilibria (i.e., better for everybody);
therefore, everyone choosing seven is the best equilibrium of all.  These properties create two
simultaneous coordination problems: (i) Players would like to coordinate on some equilibrium
(since any players who choose above the minimum are worse off than if they had matched it); and
(ii) players would like that equilibrium to be as high an action as possible.  While the weak-link
game requires extremely good coordination---because payoffs depend on the minimum action
(rather than the median or average; cf. Van Huyck, Battalio, & Beil, 1991)---this sensitivity is
useful because tends to create between-group variation in efficiency.  Between-group variation is
helpful for testing how groups with different efficiency precedents behave in a subsequent PD
game.
Experimental research on the weak-link game has found that sufficiently large groups of
subjects have difficulty coordinating their actions on the efficient equilibrium.  Van Huyck,
Battalio, & Beil (1990) find that in seven experimental sessions, with groups of size 14 to 16
subjects, at least 80% of the subjects select a one or a two by the 10th period of play.  Camerer
and Cachon (1996) replicate this result with nine-subject groups.  Of course, it may not be too
surprising that with groups this large, subjects are unable to coordinate on the efficient
equilibrium since it only takes the selection of a low action by one player to disrupt the efficient
equilibrium.
Van Huyck et al. (1990) also report the results of 14 two-player weak-link games, where
subjects play in dyads for seven periods.  In 12 of the 14 sessions subjects do play the efficient
equilibrium by the seventh period.  However, the efficient equilibrium is played in the first period
in only one of the fourteen pairs.  Hence, pairs of subjects do not start out playing efficiently, but
learn to do so reliably in several periods.  In Camerer and Knez(1994), 20 three-player weak-link
games were played for five periods.  The efficient equilibrium was reached in only four of the 20
three-player groups, and five of the groups converged to the least efficient equilibrium (choosing
7all one’s) by the fifth period.  Comparing Van Huyck et al.'s (1990) two-player results and these
three-player results shows that increasing the number of players from two to three significantly
reduces subjects' ability to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium.
Weber, Camerer, Rottenstreich, and Knez (in press) studied weak-link games in which
one randomly-chosen “leader” encouraged the group to choose large numbers, to see whether
limited one-way communication would improve efficiency.  It did not: Large (8-10 person)
groups were not able to achieve efficiency, and small (two-person groups) reached efficiency, but
did so even without the leader's speech.  Furthermore, players committed a “fundamental
attribution error” by blaming the leaders for the failure of large groups to coordinate efficiently,
and crediting leaders for the success of small groups.
Our experimental design compares weak-link games to two closely related PD games.
The first, displayed in Table 3a, superficially resembles the weak-link game because each player
selects an action from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.  Action seven corresponds to the efficient
(cooperative) outcome and action one corresponds to the inefficient outcome.  The three-action
PD game, displayed in Table 3b, is the seven-action game with actions 1, 4, and 7 relabeled 1-3.
Both of these games are multi-step versions of PD. Actions between one and seven
represent varying degrees of cooperation.  Increasing your number helps the other player more
than it hurts you, so if both players choose the highest number they are both better off.  That is, if
each player “cooperates” and selects a seven (or three) then they both receive their Pareto-
efficient payoff of $2.10.  If one player selects one (“defects”) and the other player cooperates by
selecting a seven (or three), then the defector receives his temptation payoff of $2.70, and the
other player receives the sucker payoff of $.90.  If both players select one (the dominant strategy)
they both earn $1.50, which is the unique Nash equilibrium of the PD game.
There are many, many studies of PD games (for reviews see Dawes, 1980; Murnighan,
1994; Sally, 1995; and Ledyard, 1995).  Most of this research tests variables which are
hypothesized to change the amount of cooperation.  Structural factors include the structure of
8payoffs in the game and the expected length of the relationship.  Psychological factors include
individual values, knowledge, communication, and group identity (Murnighan, 1994).  The last
two factors come into play in the current study. Here is how.
Many studies have found that players who expect their counterparts to cooperate in a PD
game are more likely to cooperate themselves (Dawes, 1980).  This results suggest that one may
be able to raise levels of cooperate behavior by raising players' expectations of cooperative
behavior.  Indeed, one of the variables which increases cooperation most strongly is
communication about the game itself and preplay promising (although merely talking has little
effect; see Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Sally, 1995).  A precedent of efficient play in an
earlier game is like a kind of tacit communication about what will happen in the future, which
may increase cooperation by raising expectations of cooperation by others.  (We test this directly
by asking subjects both how they want to play, and what they expect others to do.)
Research on group identification  (Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986) suggests that
increasing group identity will induce higher levels of cooperation, and can affect organizational
behavior (Kramer, 1992).  They argue that higher levels of interpersonal trust follow from
common membership in a group, because members expect other group members to treat them
well, and reciprocate (an expectations effect), members prefer to treat others well (a preference
effect), or because both effects occur.  Since precedent requires shared experience, it may
inherently create group identity as well.  We control for this effect by comparing subjects who
play the weak-link game, followed by a PD, with subjects who play the five-period PD once, then
play it again.  If group identity, per se, creates more cooperation then subjects should cooperate as
much in the second PD as they do in a PD which was preceded by the weak-link game.
9Hypotheses
Equilibrium Predictions
What does game theory predict about behavior in these games?  There are two kinds of
hypotheses: Predictions about what players will choose in the games; and predictions about how
behavior in the weak-link game will create a precedent which affects behavior in the PD games.
In the coordination game there are multiple equilibria: Any pair (X,X) is an equilibrium.
In games with multiple equilibria, players face the problem of converging on shared expectations
about which equilibrium will be played. (If their expectations, and consequently their behavior,
are not shared, they are "out of equilibrium" and have an incentive to change their strategies.)
Following Schelling (1960) game theorists have described focal principles which distinguish
certain equilibria by their “salience” or “psychological prominence.”  A salient equilibrium
outcome, by definition, is one which players will play if they expect others to play it too (if their
expectations are self-fulfilling).  Sources of salience include the structure of payoffs (Pareto-
efficiency, equal-sharing) or strategy labels and context (Crawford, 1997).  Experimental studies
of coordination games have established a wide variety of focal principles, which subjects use
rather cleverly to coordinate their behavior (Crawford, 1997; Camerer, 2000, chapter 7).
In the weak-link games, different focal principles predict different outcomes.  Choosing
the strategy which maximizes the minimum payoff (maximin), and “risk-dominance,” both
predict choices of one.  Payoff-dominance predicts choices of seven.  Maximizing against the
belief that the choice of the other player will be random predicts all choices are equally likely.
Game theory simply does not make a precise prediction about what is likely to happen in these
games.
In the PD games in Tables 3a-b, the unique Nash equilibrium prediction is that self-
interested players will choose one if the game is played once.  However, repeating the game five
times (with the same dyad partner) changes the prediction.  Modern theories showed that
cooperation in the finitely-repeated PD can be an equilibrium if players are not perfectly certain
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that other players are rational and self-interested (so that it pays for players who would defect in
one-shot PD's to cultivate reputations for being cooperative, Kreps et al., 1982).  Thus, one
prediction of game theory is cooperative choices of seven until close to the end (which is the
pattern usually observed in repeated-PD experiments, Murnighan & Roth, 1983; Cooper et al.,
1996).  However, defecting throughout (choosing one) is also an equilibrium. Indeed, since
defecting throughout is safer for players, but worse for everybody, the repeated game has a payoff
structure like the coordination game in Table 1b.  The key challenge for players is to coordinate
their beliefs on whether their partner is likely to choose the cooperative path, in which case they
will want to cooperate also, or whether their partner is likely to choose the defection path, in
which case they will defect too.
Precedent Hypotheses
The fact that game theory makes multiple predictions about behavior in the repeated PD
sets the stage for the role of precedent.  The focal principles listed above predict what will happen
in a multiple-equilibrium game based solely on the structure of its payoffs, or on contextual labels
which focus attention on psychologically-prominent strategies.  Precedent---having played a
particular equilibrium in the past---is another focal principle.  As Lewis (1969;36) stated,
“Precedent is merely the source of one important kind of salience: conspicuous uniqueness of an
equilibrium because we reached it last time.”  Several game-theoretic studies have shown the
empirical power of precedent (Van Huyck, Battalio, & Beil, 1991; Knez, 1998).
Note that precedent does not imply that people will simply repeat what they did in the
past.  Instead, it says that expecting others to do what they did in the past (and expecting that they
will think you will do what you did in the past, etc.) can coordinate expectations about that of
many equilibria will happen, if these expectations are self-fulfilling.  Precedent creates a socially-
understood convention, rather than (simply) an individual preference.
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The central hypothesis of this paper is that a precedent of efficient play in a weak-link
game will increase the likelihood of efficient (or cooperative) play in a subsequent five-times-
repeated PD.
 Which precedents transfer from one game to another undoubtedly depends on some
shared perception of the similarity of the games.  There is no general theory of what games
players regard as similar, and creating one is extremely important, but far too ambitious a task to
begin here (Camerer, 1998; Warglien, Devetag, & Legrenzi, 1999, for a start).  However, such a
theory should distinguish two kinds of similarity a pair of games could have: Descriptive
similarity, and payoff similarity.  (This distinction parallels the important distinction between
surface structure and "deep" structure in problem-solving; e.g., Singley and Anderson, 1989).
Descriptive “similarity” is defined by the number and identity of players, the actions available
and how they are labeled, the rules of the game, and so forth.  Payoff similarities is defined by the
payoffs associated with action combinations, the equilibrium properties of the outcomes, and
socially defined properties of payoffs (such as Pareto-dominance, equity, first-mover advantage,
and so forth).  Indeed, game theory is often interpreted as a taxonomy of games grouped into
structurally similar classes by their set of equilibria or payoff properties (all PD's have certain
properties, all signaling games have other properties, and so forth).  A complete theory of
similarity would address each of these dimensions separately and how they interact with one
another to determine perceptions of similarity.
The seven-action weak-link game and the seven-action PD game have descriptive
similarity, because their strategies are labeled in the same way (integers 1-7). They also have
payoff similarity, because both have multiple equilibria in which the efficient equilibrium
(choosing seven) is riskier and the inefficient equilibrium (choosing one, until near the end in the
PD) is safer.  However, the seven-action weak-link game and the three-action PD game only have
payoff similarity.  They are not descriptively similar because the weak-link actions 1-7 do not
correspond precisely to the PD actions 1-3.  Comparing the effect of previous experiences with
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seven-action weak-link games on behavior in subsequent seven- and three-action PD's therefore
gives an empirical sense of whether transfer requires both descriptive and payoff similarity, or
can be sustained if there is only payoff similarity.  (In future work, it would be nice to see
whether descriptive similarity alone can generate transfer.)
Experiment 1: 2-player Games
METHODS
Participants
Subjects were University of Chicago undergraduates in sessions 1-6 and Caltech
undergraduates in sessions 7-8.  The Chicago students were recruited from announcements in
economics classes and signs posted around campus.  They were promised $3 for participating
plus an unspecified sum that depended on the decisions they made and the decisions of others.
The Caltech undergraduates were given the same information about earnings and were recruited
from an electronic subject mailing list.
Design
Table 4 summarizes the design.  In all sessions, several two-subject dyads played two
consecutive rounds of a five-period game.  The games are denoted by W (weak-link), and P(3) or
P(7), for three- or seven-action PD.  In treatment WP(7), for example, each dyad played the
weak-link game in round one and then played the seven-action PD game in round two. In
treatment PP(7), subjects played the seven-action PD in both rounds.
Using this notation, the precedent hypothesis is that there will be more cooperation in the
second-round PD in treatment WP(7) than in the second-round PD in treatment PP(7) (provided
subjects play efficiently in the weak-link game).  If precedent transfer is only due to descriptive
similarity, there will be more second-round cooperation in WP(7) than in PP(7), and equal
amounts of second-round cooperation in PP(7) and in WP(3) (where there is payoff similarity but
no descriptive similarity).  If precedent transfer is due to payoff similarity, there will be equal
amounts of transfer in those two comparisons.
13
Procedure
Ten to fourteen subjects participated in each session. Subjects sat in a room together and
were given a common set of instructions, which were read aloud (so subjects could be sure that
others had the same instructions as they had).  Subjects were told there were two rounds of play,
and each round had five periods.  They were not told about the structure of round two until round
one was over.  While subjects were organized into dyads, they did not know who their dyad
partner was.  The instructions (shown in the appendix) were written abstractly.
In general, we followed conventions in experimental economics rather than conventions
in psychology (Camerer, 1996: Loewenstein, 1999; Hertwig & Ortmann, in press, for more
discussion). Subjects were actually paid their earnings from the games (in addition to a $3 show-
up fee); the game was repeated to allow learning and equilibration; there was no deception; and
the game was described abstractly.  Abstract description does not seem to matter empirically
because an earlier experiment found no differences between the weak-link game played by
choosing 1-7 (as in our experiment) or described by a cover story involving timing of
contributions to a group project (Weber, et al., in press).
In each period subjects chose an action from the set of actions {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} (or {1,
2, 3} in the three-action PD).  In addition to making choices, each subject guessed the action of
the other player in their dyad, and earned $.10 if they guessed correctly.  After each choice, they
were told the minimum choice of their dyad, computed their earnings from that period, and
awaited the next round.
RESULTS
The results are shown in Table 5 below.  The Table pools the two sessions in each
treatment, and shows the total number of subjects selecting a particular action in a particular
period of play.  For example, in the first period of the weak-link games played under treatment
WS(7), 22 of 24 subjects selected a seven while the other two subjects selected a five.
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In the weak link games in the first round of treatments WP(7) and WP(3), all but two
dyads of subjects played the efficient Pareto-dominant equilibrium (choosing seven’s) by the fifth
period. (These data replicates the results of Van Huyck et al., 1990.)
In the PP(7) experiments, in contrast, by the fifth period of play in the first-round PD,
most of the subjects chose an inefficient one (15/22) while only two subjects (in different groups)
chose seven.  Hence, a homegrown precedent of efficient play was generated in all but two of the
weak-link dyads, while a precedent of inefficient play was generated in the first-round PD dyads.
We first test the precedent hypothesis by comparing the distributions of actions chosen by
subjects in the first period of the second round, across the WP(7) and PP(7) treatments.  The
results are consistent with the precedent hypothesis, because PD play in round two after weak-
link play WP(7) is significantly different than first-period play in both the first and second rounds
of the PP(7) control groups, at p < .001 and p < .05, respectively (using a conservative
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, see Table 6).
The effect of first-round precedent is also quite large in magnitude: Most of the subjects
(71%) choose efficiently in the first period of round two of WP(7), compared to small minorities
of 15% in the first period of round two of PP(7) and 30% in the first period of round one of PP(7).
The comparison between second-round choices in WP(3) and PP(3) tests whether
precedent has an effect when the two games are only payoff similar, but are not descriptively
similar.  There is a minor effect of  playing the weak-link game first---50% choose the efficient
action in the first period of  WP(3), compared to 29% and 42% in the round one and round 2 of
PP(3)---but the effect is not statistically significant.
Our precedent hypothesis is about shared expectations of cooperative actions.  Therefore,
it is important that experience in the weak-link game has a strong effect on guesses about what
others will do, which are made before period one in the second round (shown in parentheses in
Table 5).  Once again, the precedent effect on expectations is relatively strong for seven-action
games (p = .02 and .10 for respective comparisons with first- and second-round PP(7) results) and
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weak for transfer from seven-action weak-link games to three-action PD's.  This is important
evidence for the precedent interpretation. If players were simply repeating the numbers they
chose earlier when they begin playing the PD, they would not necessarily say they thought others
would repeat the same numbers, but they do.
Experiment 2: 3-Player Games
Experiment 1 showed that there is an effect of precedent: A history of efficient play in the
seven-action weak-link game is correlated with an increase in efficient play in a subsequent PD
game.  However, this seems to be primarily due to descriptive similarity rather than establishing a
precedent of efficiency that transfers across payoff-similar games, because the effect of seven-
action weak-link precedent on subsequent three-action PD's is weak.
A drawback of the dyadic results is that coordinating in the weak-link game is “too easy”
for dyads, so we did not observe any variation in efficiency across dyads.  Based on earlier work
(Camerer & Knez, 1994), we hypothesized that using three-player groups would generate a wider
range of variation in efficiency levels in the weak-link part of the experiment.  Wider variation
would allow a cross-group comparison of how precedents of efficiency (or inefficiency) in
coordination games affects play in subsequent PD's, to complement the cross-condition results
from experiment 1.
Subjects
Subjects were 33 University of Chicago undergraduates recruited and paid as in
Experiment 1.
Design
The design had two treatments.  In the first treatment, subjects were grouped into triads.
Each triad played five periods of a three-person weak-link game in the first round, followed by
five periods of a three-person PD game in the second round.  As in Experiment 1, we refer to this
treatment as 3WP(7) (where the 3 denotes triadic behavior rather than dyadic).
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The second treatment was conducted after the results of the first.  (Thus, these two
treatments are not cells in a proper design, but they are reported together for coherence and
brevity.)  The second treatment was designed to generate a larger percentage of efficient triads
than in the first treatment.  To do so, we exploited the facts that (a) two-person dyads behave
quite efficiently, and (b) precedent has empirical force in coordination games, to see if efficient
triads could be “grown” by adding one subject to a dyad who had played together for several
periods.  We refer to this treatment as 2,3WP(7).
Procedure
Experiment 2 procedures were almost identical to experiment 1, except that players in a
dyad or triad were told the choices by all subjects in their group, rather than simply the minimum
choice.
In 3WP(7) sessions 1-2, the procedures were the same as in Experiment 1, except that 21
players were organized into triads.  Each triad first played a three-person weak-link game with the
same payoffs as in Table 2 (except a player's payoff depended on her choice and the minimum of
the other two players' choices).
In the one 2,3WP(7) session, a total of 12 subjects participated.  In the first round of the
experiment, eight of the twelve subjects were organized into dyads.  Each dyad played a weak-
link game for five periods. We call these subjects incumbents.  The remaining four subjects did
nothing during this first round of play (although they read the instructions for the first round
along with the subjects participating in dyads as they were being read out loud by the
experimenter).
In the second round, one subject who did not participate in the first round was added to
each of the dyads from the first round, creating a triad.  We call the added subjects entrants. Each
entrant was told the history of actions selected in all periods of the first round by the two
incumbents in their newly-formed triad, and the incumbents knew the entrants were given that
history. (Camerer & Knez, 1994, found that subsequent behavior was sensitive to this kind of
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history information, which is more evidence for the precedent view instead of the theory that
players just repeat old choices.)
Each triad then played a three-player weak-link game for five periods.  Then, in a third
five-period round, the triads played a three-player (seven-action) PD game, with payoffs shown in
Table 7.  The three-player PD is like the two-player PD except that a player's payoffs depend on
her own choice, and on the sum of the choices of the other two players.
We hypothesize three effects.  First, we expect higher numbers (and more efficiency) in
the weak-link games in the 23W(7) treatment, compared to the 3WP(7) treatment.  We expect this
because dyads are likely to play efficiently, and adding one entrant who knows the incumbents'
history is likely to lead to all three triad members playing more efficiently than groups which
began as triads.  Second, if the first hypothesis is confirmed, creating a stronger efficiency
precedent in the 2,3WP(7) condition, we expect to see more cooperation in the subsequent third-
round PD than in the corresponding second-round PD in the 3WP(7) condition.  Third, we expect
dispersion in the numbers chosen by different triads (both within the 3WP(7) condition, and
pooling across triads in the 3W(7) and 2,3WP(7) conditions); and we expect that triadic
efficiency in the weak-link game will be correlated, across triads, with cooperation in the
subsequent PD.
Results
The results of experiment 2 are displayed in Tables 8a-b.  (For brevity, only periods one
and five of rounds one and two are displayed in Table 8b.)
First look at the 3WP(7) results in Table 8a.  Consistent with the results reported earlier
(Camerer & Knez, 1994), triads had difficulty reaching the efficient equilibrium in the weak-link
game.  Out of seven triads, one coordinated on 7 and two groups came close.
Unlike in experiment 1 (when almost all dyads converged on seven), differences in
behavior among the triads permit a cross-triad comparison of efficiency in the weak-link game
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with first-period behavior in the subsequent three-person PD, to test for transfer of precedent.
There is modest evidence of transfer, because the correlation between actions selected in the last
period of the weak-link game and actions selected in the first period of the PD game is .25, which
is marginally significant (p = .063, one-tailed z-test).
Now turn to Table 8b, which summarizes results from the 2,3WP(7) session.  All four of
the two-player groups played the efficient equilibrium by the final period of the first round.  In
round 2, after a third player was added, all four three-player groups played the efficient
equilibrium in every period of play.  These results are in striking contrast to the behavior
observed in 3WP(7) in Table 8a, in which only one of the seven three-player groups reached the
efficient equilibrium.
The comparison between de novo triads in Table 8a, and “cultivated” triads in Table 8b
shows the power of precedent within a sequence of plays of the same game (even when the
number of subjects grows).  Weber (1999) took the idea further by starting with dyads and
gradually adding entrants who knew the previous player's history, one by one, until the group size
reached 12.  He was able to “grow” large groups, if the rate of adding entrants was slow enough,
which played much more efficiently than equal-sized groups which started out large.  (Recall that
all the 14-16-person groups in Van Huyck, Battalio, & Beil's (1990) study converged to the worst
equilibrium, a minimum of one.)  In addition, subjects who were able to endogeneously control
the rate of growth tended to add entrants far too quickly (leading to inefficient large groups); they
did not seem to appreciate how quickly coordination failure could occur, and how hard it was to
reverse.  Weber interprets these results as a partial explanation for why small organizations grow
too quickly and subsequently fail.
Table 8b also shows that the efficient triads in the 2,3WP(7) condition play the
subsequent three-player PD quite cooperatively (75% choose the most cooperative strategy
seven).  This pattern is consistent with a transfer of precedent, but since there is no variation in
19
triadic weak-link behavior, and no three-person PP(7) control group, we cannot conclude that
precedent per se causes the high level of PD cooperation.
By pooling across triads in the 3WP(7) condition and the 2,3WP(7) condition, we get a
healthy amount of variation in triadic weak-link efficiency, to test whether different efficiency
precedents affect behavior in the subsequent PD.  Pooling across the conditions, the correlation
between individual choices in the final weak-link period and the first PD period is .275 (p = .028,
one-tailed z-test).  Taking triads as the unit of analysis, 11 of 15 (73%) subjects who had played
in an efficient group in the weak-link game chose a seven in the first period of PD, while 4 of 18
(22%) subjects from inefficient triads chose a seven (2 = 8.62, p < .004).  The corresponding
figures for subjects' expectations about what others would pick in the final-round PD are 12 of 15
(80%) for efficient triads and 3 of 18 (17%) for inefficient (2 = 13.24, p < .001).  Of course,
these pooled results should be taken with a grain of salt because the conditions leading up to the
final period of weak-link play are different in the two conditions (the 2,3WP(7) subjects played
more periods, and had a history of efficiency from their dyadic past).
Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to formalize and test the intuition of Blau (1964) and others
that cooperation develops over time in exchange relationships as exchange partners move from
less risky situations to more risky situations.
We start by asking what type of prior experiences in strategic situations (games) support
the trust building process.  One place to look for “experience effects” is to see whether experience
in previous PD games affects later PD games.  Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1985, 1991) have
done this and found evidence that norms of cooperation develop, which transfer across different
PD games.  However, their results beg the question of what generated cooperation in the earlier
games, and raises a new question: Does cooperation transfer across different types of games?  We
address the second question by testing whether efficient cooperation in coordination games
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creates a precedent of efficiency that transfers to PD games, increasing cooperation (relative to
control groups).
The coordination games we studied are “`weak-link” games in which players choose
actions from one to seven.  A player's payoff increases with the minimum action anybody chose,
and decreases with the distance between their own action and the minimum.  In these weak-link
games, there is a “Nash (mutual best-response equilibrium)” in which everybody chooses seven,
playing efficiently.  We tested the hypothesis that the shared experience of playing the efficient
equilibrium in the weak-link game would create a precedent of efficient play strong enough to
generate expectations of cooperation in a finitely-repeated PD game, and whether those
expectations would lead to cooperation.
There are several justifications for using coordination games to generate a precedent of
cooperation.  First, in these coordination games the efficient outcome is an equilibrium (unlike in
one-shot PD's) but reaching it is by no means easy.  It requires players to have sufficient faith that
their counterparts will select the efficient action.  Since efficiency is not assured, one might think
that substantial trust is built when efficiency is reached.
Second, there is a game-theoretic justification for using coordination games to generate
“cooperative” experiences.  The folk theorem of repeated games says that when a game is played
repeatedly, equilibria can arise that are not equilibria in the stage game.  A famous example is
“tit-for-tat” in the repeated PD (play cooperatively at first, then mimic what the other player did
in the previous period), which supports the cooperative outcome in the repeated PD game, even
though defection is predicted in the one-shot PD.  While cooperation can be an equilibrium in the
finitely-repeated PD (until near the end), defection all the way through is also an equilibrium.
Given the multiplicity of equilibrium implied by repetition of the game, players face the problem
of selecting one of these equilibria---that is, they face a coordination problem.  In fact, it is easy
to show that the infinitely repeated PD game has the payoff properties of a weak-link game
(Miller, 1992; Camerer & Knez, 1996a,b).  If players transfer precedents from one game to a new
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game that has similar payoff properties, they should transfer efficiency from the weak-link game
(if they achieve it) to the repeated PD.
Finally, there is a practical justification for examining transfer from coordination games
to PD's.  Organizations are complex webs of exchange relationships in which participants
(workers and managers) implicitly compete with their peers for resources and promotions
(effectively playing PD's).  At the same time, they are highly dependent on these peers in their
day-to-day, interdependent work activities in which they have common goals.  All suffer if one
person makes a mistake (effectively playing weak-link games; Baker, 1994).  Indeed, discussions
of organizational culture implicitly assume that expectations of peer behavior generalize across
these types of situations to form a set of  “organizational expectations.”  Little is known about
how these expectations are generalized from one organizational situation to another.  Experiments
with sequences of different games are one simple way to begin studying the generalization
process.  Experiments with coordination games followed by PD's are also the right way to study
organizational development over time, if small organizations resemble weak-link games but large
organizations resemble PD's (for reasons mentioned in the introduction).
To study transfer of precedents from coordination to PD games, we conducted two
experiments with a total of 123 subjects.  The results show that positive precedent effects are
possible.  In dyadic experiments, players who have participated in seven-action weak-link games,
and reached efficiency, tend to choose much more cooperatively in subsequent seven-action PD's,
compared to a control group of subjects who simply participate in two PD's in a row.  There is
also a substantial effect of precedent across three-person triads (which vary more in efficiency
than dyads): Triads which played more efficiently in weak-link games tended to expect more
cooperation, and also to be more cooperative, in subsequent PD's.  At the individual level, the
correlation between final-period weak-link actions and first-period PD actions was .25-.30
(modestly significant).
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We have one hunch about why these precedent effects are not larger in magnitude.  There
may be a “reverse precedent effect” which causes behavior to go in the opposite direction of an
inefficient precedent.  Playing inefficiently in the weak-link game reminds players of how costly
inefficiency can be.  This shared experience could galvanize their collective desire to play
cooperatively, provided they get a chance to start over, which they do in the second-round PD.  In
this interpretation, behavior generates a precedent of inefficiency, which is overruled by a meta-
precedent---“do what we did before if it worked, and do the opposite if it failed” (cf. Seely, Van
Huyck, and Battalio, 1999).
A very important qualification from our data is that the effect of a precedent of efficiency
in seven-action coordination games on three-action PD's is much weaker (and insignificant) than
the effect on seven-action PD's.  This difference suggests transfer works best across games which
are descriptively similar (have the same labels or surface structure, as in transfer of problem-
solving skills; Singley & Anderson, 1989).  Transfer is weaker when games that have similar
payoff structures but different descriptions.
Even if the lion's share of the precedent effect is due to surface transfer across
descriptively similar games, documenting the effect is a contribution to the vast literature on
cooperation in the PD (and in related public goods games).  Indeed, the size of the effects we
reported are quite large compared to the effects of other variables that have been studied in
previous PD experiments.  For example, in this journal Pillutla and Chen (1999) reported a
significant effect of labeling the PD actions differently (in an economic versus a non-economic
way).  Their labeling change increased first-period cooperation from 32% to 39%, an effect which
is only a fraction as large as the corresponding increase, from 15-30% to 71%, in our two-player
games.  Thus, even if the precedent effect we observe is simply due to transfer of expectations
that players will keep choosing similarly-numbered strategies, it represents a huge increment in
cooperation.
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A similar point is made by Ahn et al. (1998).  Like us, they found that efficiency in 2-
person weak-link (“stag hunt”) games influenced the rate of cooperation in subsequent one-shot
PD's (which were descriptively similar to the weak-link games).  Subjects who had encountered
no efficient outcomes in eight previous stag hunt games cooperated in subsequent PD's with 16%
probability, while subjects who had encountered eight previous efficient outcomes cooperated
65% of the time.  They also found that the precedent effect is much stronger in magnitude than
the effect of changing payoffs (changing the “temptation” or greed premium to defecting against
a cooperator, and the “sucker” or fear loss from cooperating against a defector).
While it is premature to conclude that precedent effects are necessarily reliable or
cognitively deep (due to payoff similarity), our results and Ahn et al.'s find precedent effects that
are much larger in magnitude than many other variables which have been exhaustively studied
(such as labels and payoffs) in the PD.  On an empirical basis, then, transfer of precedents across
games certainly deserves to be studied more thoroughly as a determinant of PD behavior.  The
pressing open questions are whether players are really transferring a precedent of efficiency (as
opposed to merely repeating, and expecting repetition of, previous behavior), and what features of
similarity between games affect the amount of transfer.
Finally, in the introduction we noted that many discussions of organizational behavior
implicitly assume transfer across organizational tasks or games, by discussing cross-situational
concepts like organizational expectations, learning, and culture.  We mentioned that many firms
actively employ trust- and team-building exercises away from the office grind.  They must think
behavior in these exercises will transfer to workplace activities.  Our results suggest that transfer
is mostly limited to those cases in which activities have similar descriptions, rather than to those
with similar strategic structures and different descriptions (cf. Glaeser et al, in press, who find
low correlations across different measures of trust).  Taken seriously, this claim predicts that
making trust-building exercises too different than office life may undermine their usefulness by
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limiting transfer.  We wouldn't bet heavily that our conclusion is correct, but we will bet that an
experiment evaluating cross-experience transfer would prove interesting.
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Table 2: Weak-Link Game
MINIMUM VALUE OF X CHOSEN BY
OTHERS
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 1.30 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.10
YOUR 6 1.20 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20
CHOICE 5 1.10 1.10 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30
OF X 4 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40
3 .90 .90 .90 .90 0.90 0.70 0.50
2  .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 0.80 0.60
1 .70 .70 .70 .70 .70 .70 0.70
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Table 3a: 2-Player PD Game with 7 actions
 Other Player's Choice of X
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7
2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6
Your 3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5
Choice 4 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
of X 5 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
6 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2
7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1
Table 3b: 2-Player PD Game with 3 actions
Other Player’s Choice of X
1 2 3
Your 1 1.5 2.1 2.7
Choice 2 1.2 1.8 2.4
of  X 3 0.9 1.5 2.1
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Table 4: Experimental Design – 2-player experiments
Session # of Subjects Treatment      Round 1                 Round 2
1 10 WP(7)    Weak-link            7-action PD
2 14 WP(7)    Weak-link            7-action PD
3 10 PP(7)     7-action PD        7-action PD
4 10 PP(7)     7-action PD        7-action PD
5 10 WP(3)    Weak-link            3-action PD
6 12 WP(3)    Weak-link            3-action PD
7 12 PP(3)    3-action PD          3-action PD
8 12 PP(3)    3-action PD          3-action PD
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Table 5: Total numbers of choices of actions 1-7 or 1-3
Round 1 Round 2
Period Period
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
WP(7) Weak – link game 7-action PD
No. of 7’s 22 24 24 24 24 17 (20) 14 14 16 9
No. of 6’s 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 0 0 0 0
No. of 5’s 2 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 0 0 0 0
No. of 4’s 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 1 1 1 0
No. of 3’s 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 0 0 1 0
No. of 2’s 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 0 0 0 0
No. of 1’s 0 0 0 0 0 6 (3) 9 9 6 15
PP(7) 7-action PD 7-action PD
No. of 7’s 3 (7) 2 2 3 2 6 (10) 4 4 4 2
No. of 6’s 4 (2) 1 1 2 0 1 (0) 0 0 1 0
No. of 5’s 0 (0) 1 0 0 0 0 (0) 0 0 0 0
No. of 4’s 2 (5) 2 1 0 1 3 (0) 2 2 2 0
No. of 3’s 0 (1) 1 3 0 1 2 (1) 3 1 1 2
No. of 2’s 2 (1) 0 2 4 1 2 (0) 1 1 2 0
No. of 1’s 9 (4) 13 11 11 15 6 (6) 10 12 10 16
Weak – link game 3-action PD
No. of 7’s 16 19 20 0 21
No. of 6’s 1 0 0 0 0
No. of 5’s 3 2 2 2 2
No. of 4’s 1 0 0 0 1
No. of 3’s 0 1 0 0 0 11 (13) 11 12 10 4
No. of 2’s 0 0 0 0 0 1 (3) 3 3 3 2
No. of 1’s 1 0 0 0 0 10 (6) 8 7 9 16
PP(3) 3-action PD 3-action PD
No. of 3’s 7(11) 7 7 7 6 10(15) 12 14 15 9
No. of 2’s 3(2) 4 3 2 1 4(2) 4 6 5 4
No. of 1’s 14(11) 13 14 15 17 10(7) 8 4 4 11
Note: Entries in parentheses are the number of times a subject guessed that the other player would
select that action
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Table 6:  Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics for treatments effects on number
of cooperative actions selected.
7-action S games PP(7:2.1) WP(7:2.1)
WP(7:2.1) 0.41 (.05)
PP(7:1.1) 0.15 (n.s.) 0.56 (.005)
3-action S games PP(3:2.1) WP(3:2.1)
WP(3:2.1) 0.08 (n.s.)
PP(3:1.1) 0.17 (n.s.) 0.21 (n.s.)
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Table 7: 3-Player PD Game
 Your Choice of X
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1 .9
3 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1
Sum of 4 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
X's 5 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
 Selected 6 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
By Other 7 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
Two 8 2.1 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5
Players 9 2.2 2.1 2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
10 2.3 2.2 2.1 2 1.9 1.8 1.7
11 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2 1.9 1.8
12 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2 1.9
13 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2
14 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1
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Table 8a: Results of  3WP(7) treatment (sessions 1-2 pooled), experiment 2
Round 1 Round 2
Period period
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
3WP(7) 3-player weak–link game 7-action PD
No. of 7’s 12 8 9 9 7 6 3 1 0 0
No. of 6’s 1 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 0 1
No. of 5’s 3 2 3 1 1 4 3 1 0 0
No. of 4’s 2 3 0 2 1 5 4 3 1 1
No. of 3’s 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 1 2 0
No. of 2’s 0 0 2 3 3 0 1 0 2 1
No. of 1’s 1 0 1 2 6 5 9 13 16 18
Table 8b: Results of  2,3WP(7) treatment, experiment 2
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Period 1 5 1 5 1 2 3 4 5
Game
2-player
weak-link
3-player
weak-link
3-player, 7-action PD
No. of 7’s 6 8 12 12 9 8 6 6 3
No. of 6’s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No. of 5’s 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No. of 4’s 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No. of 3’s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No. of 2’s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No. of 1’s 0 0 0 0 3 4 6 6 9
